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 The Potential for Moral Hazard Behavior  
in Irrigation Decisions under Crop Insurance 
We used simulation analysis with realistic parameters 
from the existing crop insurance program, agronomic 
crop-water production function information, histori-
cal weather conditions, and current prices to deter-
mine if there is an incentive to change irrigation use 
under crop insurance (relative to the no-insurance 
case). Our results showed that under the existing crop 
insurance policy design with current input and output 
prices, there is no incentive to adjust irrigation use, 
and optimal irrigation use is the same with or without 
crop insurance. We also found that if irrigation costs 
increase significantly, it may become financially bene-
ficial to reduce irrigation application.   
Our analysis accounts explicitly for the fact that insur-
ance premiums and benefits are a function of Actual 
Production History (APH). In its simplest form, APH 
is an average of the 10 most recent yields in one’s 
cropping history. Since input use affects APH for the 
next 10 years, the use of production history introduces 
temporal dynamics into farmers’ input use decision 
making. Deliberately using low levels of inputs to take 
advantage of crop insurance (i.e., moral hazard) will 
reduce APH for the next 10 years. Consequently, the 
dynamics help alleviate the moral hazard problem. 
Importantly, the crop insurance program design in-
cludes more complex rules that can modify APH, and 
we examine yield adjustment1. 
In the case of unexpected catastrophic yield-damaging 
events (e.g., drought, hail, flood), a producer can elect 
to substitute 60% of a county’s T-yield for his yield in 
the APH calculation with yield adjustment (YA). A  
______________ 
1 We also examine trend adjustment in the full article. Results can 
be found in the full article.  
Background: The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation pro-
vides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools 
used by crop producers across the United States. In 2018, 
over 90% of corn and soybean acres were insured in most 
of the Great Plains and Midwestern United States (Farm 
Bureau, 2019). As with all insurance, there are questions of 
whether moral hazard behavior occurs with insurance en-
rollment. In economics, moral hazard refers to cases where 
someone makes riskier decisions when he or she is protect-
ed from the full cost of doing so. For example, someone 
with fire insurance on their home may be less careful about 
checking and replacing smoke alarms than someone with-
out fire insurance. With crop insurance, moral hazard oc-
curs if a producer makes riskier operating decisions be-
cause of the loss protection provided by insurance.  
In a recent project, we combined information about the 
federal crop insurance program with parameterized crop-
water production function information to determine if 
there is an incentive for moral hazard in irrigation deci-
sions under crop insurance. A naïve approach suggests that 
a producer would deliberately reduce irrigation with crop 
insurance since he can save the cost of irrigation and re-
ceive an indemnity for lost revenue. However, this naïve 
statement ignores many of the realities of the crop insur-
ance program. Recent work (Mieno et al., 2018) suggests 
that when the dynamics of crop insurance are incorpo-
rated, moral hazard may either decrease or increase input 
use since the benefits of higher yield accrue for multiple 
years. In our work, we asked the following questions: 1) Is 
there an economic incentive to change irrigation manage-
ment under crop insurance when realistic features of the 
crop insurance program are included?, and 2) How does 
the economic incentive change if important features of 
crop insurance program design are modified? 
County’s T-yield value is based on the historical average 
yield. For example, the T-yield for irrigated corn in 2018 for 
Chase County, Nebraska, was 185 bushels per acre. Consid-
er someone who has produced 200 bushels per acre for the 
past nine years. If hail wipes out his crop (no yield), the 
yield is zero in the tenth year. Without YA, his APH would 
be 180 (calculated as [200×9+0×1]/10). With YA, he can 
substitute 60% of the county T-yield (0.6×185 = 111) for the 
zero, which results in an APH of 191 (calculated as 
[200×9+111]/10). We examine various levels of YA to un-
derstand the potential impact on irrigation usage.  
Modeling Approach: Our analysis used USDA-RMA actu-
ary parameters for Chase County, Nebraska for the 2017 
production season. Chase County is in southwestern Ne-
braska in the Republican River Basin. Irrigation in the re-
gion is primarily from the Ogallala Aquifer. While concerns 
about the long-term sustainability of groundwater use 
throughout the Ogallala Aquifer are significant, this region 
also has short-term needs to limit groundwater use.  
Estimating the impact of crop insurance on farmer’s water-
use decisions requires understanding the response of crop 
yields to irrigation inputs, and how this response varies un-
der different growing season weather conditions. We esti-
mated the crop-water production function for corn in Chase 
County using AquaCrop-OS. AquaCrop-OS is a free, open-
source version of AquaCrop, a crop water productivity 
model developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (Foster et al., 2017). AquaCrop-OS 
relates crop yield and total seasonal applied water to a soil 
moisture target and weather conditions. Our approach al-
lowed the soil moisture target to vary intra-seasonally by 
crop growth stage, reflecting differing crop sensitivity to 
water stress throughout the season. All simulations used 
crop parameters that have previously been calibrated for 
typical corn hybrids grown in the U.S. and assume that irri-
gation is applied using a center-pivot irrigation system (the 
common technology used in the study region) with an ap-
plication efficiency of 90%. Figure 1 shows the distribution  
of generated yields. We created a representative sample 
of weather scenarios for our study region by using ob-
served time-series data for the study area from a weath-
er station in Champion, Nebraska. 
We solve the dynamic optimization problem under 
various combinations of irrigation costs and YA ratios. 
Insurance costs are dynamically updated each year to 
reflect yield history. We include irrigation costs of $6, 
$10, $14, and $18 per acre-inch. We include YA ratios 
of 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 (status quo), 0.8, and 1. A YA ratio of 
0.4 means that a producer can substitute 40% of the 
county T-yield for actual yield in the APH calculation. 
A ratio of 0 is equivalent to not allowing any yield ad-
justment, and a ratio of 1 means that a producer can 
fully substitute the county T-yield without penalty.  
Results: Table 1 compares the average optimal irriga-
tion use with and without insurance at the different 
levels of irrigation cost and adjustment ratio. At lower 
irrigation costs ($6 and $10), there is no incentive for 
moral hazard at any YA ratio. For costs of $14/acre-
inch and $18/acre-inch, increasing the adjustment ratio 
from the status quo has a sizable impact on moral haz-
ard incentives. Allowing full replacement (ratio = 1.0) 
with the county T-yield reduces irrigation applied by 
2.03 and 4.30 acre-inches relative to no insurance when 
costs are $14 and $18 per acre-inch, respectively. This 
is a net reduction of 0.93 (2.03−1.10 = 0.93) and 2.30 
(4.30−2.00 = 2.30) acre-inches, relative to the status 
quo. In contrast, lowering the adjustment ratio has a 
much smaller effect on applied irrigation. An adjust-
ment ratio of 0.0 is equivalent to not allowing YA. Ad-
justing the crop insurance program to not allow YA is 
expected to increase applied irrigation by 0.24 (10.38–
10.14) and 0.68 (8.9-8.22) at costs of $14 and $18, rela-
tive to the status quo, respectively. 
Our results show that at high costs, there are substan-
tial differences between the insured and non-insured 
optimal irrigation application rates. 
One possible explanation for this 
result is the presence of a moral 
hazard cycle, where periods of full 
irrigation are followed by periods of 
little or no irrigation (this was 
found in previous work by Vercam-
men and van Kooten, 1994). If in-
surance rules that require the appli-
cation of sufficient irrigation to 
meet crop water requirements are 
enforced, then it may not be practi-
cally possible for farmers to adopt 
this approach. We test this by im-
posing a requirement that farmers 
only choose soil moisture target 
strategies with an expected level of  




















6 0.0 - 1.0 12.51 12.50 0.01 





0.2 10.33 -0.91 
0.4 10.25 -0.99 
0.6 10.14 -1.10 
0.8 9.79 -1.45 





0.2 8.84 -1.38 
0.4 8.69 -1.53 
0.6 8.22 -2.00 
0.8 7.58 -2.65 
1.0 5.92 -4.31 
Table 1: The Impact of Yield Adjustment on Optimal Irrigation 










6 Yes/No 12.51 12.50 0.01 
10 Yes/No 11.44 11.44 0.00 
14 Yes 11.08 11.24 -0.15 
No 10.14 -1.10 
18 Yes 10.23 10.22 0.01 
No 8.22 -2.00 
Table 2: The Impact of the Sufficient Irrigation Requirement on Opti-
mal Irrigation 
Note: This table presents the mean optimal irrigation amount under various irrigation costs and 
YA ratios. “With Insurance” and “No Insurance” columns present optimal irrigation with and 
without crop insurance, respectively. “Difference” compares the two cases. All adjustment ratios 
are estimated for $6 and $10 independently with identical results. 
Note: Results are based on the status quo yield adjustment ratio of 0.6. 
irrigation of at least 5 acre-inches. The results are in Table 
2, which compares the expected level of irrigation based 
on policy enforcement. Results show that when a zero- 
irrigation strategy is not feasible (i.e., the requirement 
is enforced), the incentive for moral hazard is nearly 
eliminated at all irrigation costs.  
Discussion and Conclusion: Our results show that under 
the current policy design and at current irrigation costs, 
there is little incentive to adjust irrigation use due to crop 
insurance. However, if both the YA ratio and the cost in-
crease, that incentive increases significantly. These results 
are driven almost entirely by a moral hazard cycle, where 
producers switch between irrigation and no irrigation. En-
forcement that eliminates the zero-irrigation option nearly 
eliminates these effects. When enforcement is not fully fea-
sible, policies to increase the cost of irrigation to reduce 
water use (e.g., water tax) may inadvertently affect insur-
ance incentives. In most cases, the policies shift water use in 
the same direction. A higher water tax reduces irrigation 
use directly via the tax, and indirectly via an insurance in-
centive. However, there are cases where the policies work in 
opposite directions. 
While the results provide important insight about crop in-
surance policy design, it is important to keep in mind that 
the outcomes are based on simulations and not on empiri-
cal data. Our results are determined by an optimization 
procedure that incorporates risk aversion but does not in-
corporate other behavioral factors. The results show that if 
a producer chooses to do so, incentives to adjust irrigation 
exist in certain cases but does not suggest that producers 
are doing this in practice.  
 
 
For more information on this project, refer to: Suchato, P., 
Mieno, T., Schoengold, K., & Foster, T. The potential for 
moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop 
insurance. Agricultural Economics. 2021. 1-17. https://
doi.org/10.1111/agec.12676 
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